Misunderstanding Hypocrisy

Suggesting that a critical concern for our cultural moment is about understanding the nature of ‘hypocrisy’ may appear to be a real misstep. We have pressing issues facing the world from a myriad of directions, and adjudicating who the hypocrites are seems to be a completely ancillary concern. I would contend, however, that properly perceiving the notion of ‘hypocrisy’ is essential in nearly every major issue besetting us today. Importantly, the question of hypocrisy never has a substance of its own; someone is always a hypocrite about something, and that something is never the hypocrisy itself. This makes it not so much competitive with these other concerns du jour but rather complementary to their resolution. My argument will bear this out — but I confess I see few, if any, issues today untouched by this problem.

I will start simply: what — if it is so misunderstood — is hypocrisy? Most directly, hypocrisy is holding others to a standard one does not apply to oneself. We should note that this definition centralizes the agent’s belief about the standard in question: the hypocrite does not truly believe his principle to be true; rather, he espouses it in a merely empty manner—most likely for the sake of manipulation, such as appearing moral through espousing lofty standards. We can think of examples. Take a philanderer who laments the ‘decline of marriage’ or the ‘shallowness of modern dating.’ His criticism of contemporary romance is predicated on a standard of fidelity and seriousness he plainly does not live by himself. Critically, however, this says nothing of the truth of his claim about current courtship practices. Even here, though this may seem like a textbook case of hypocrisy, the situation is more complex than it appears; we would need to assess if he actually does not believe in his principles and is merely using them for some other end (like justifying his behaviour). Nevertheless, in my view, the definition of hypocrisy has been corrupted by two predominant misinterpretations: i) we call people hypocrites simply for failing to meet their own standards; and ii) we accuse of hypocrisy those who revise their views — especially when those revisions implicate their past selves. I take each in turn.

The first form of misunderstanding hypocrisy is that someone claims to abide by a certain standard or principle but then obviously violates that same rule in some manner—he fails. We might imagine someone who is always talking about the importance of saving money and being financially responsible who simultaneously spends money in largely unnecessary and avoidable ways: daily purchases of expensive lattes at cafes or frequent nights out at the bar. This appears to take the form of hypocrisy in the way I have defined, though the circumstances may be more complex. What is important is the sense in which the person approaches his principles for being financially savvy. If he is espousing these principles of frugality but thinking that they do not apply to himself for whatever reasons, this may in fact be a form of hypocrisy; if, however, he developed a habit of being impulsive with purchases (perhaps growing up in a home where this was a common occurrence), then he may in fact recognize his errors when brought to reflect upon it. In such a case, failure is not hypocrisy; it is merely what it is: failing to live up to one’s ideals.

The second way in which hypocrisy is incorrectly rendered is as the reformulation of one’s opinions. I know a handful of people who have entered religious life and seem to believe they are called to lives of celibacy; I also know that some of them certainly did not remain chaste in their pre-ascetical life. When, therefore, they recommend and defend a life of celibacy and chastity, they are often taken as being ‘hypocrites’ because they have prior failed by those same standards. This notion of hypocrisy likely emerges because those who have had such changes of mind do not grant the same flexibility to others in making their own choices and coming to their own verdicts in the same way. If we wish to be generous to this misunderstanding, hypocrisy could also be leveled in such instances because there is a suspicion that the person is only performatively espousing this new principle as a way of getting out of prior wrongdoings—hypocrisy could therefore be possible, but it is highly speculative.

I recognize that these two misunderstandings of hypocrisy, as failure and reform, may seem only slightly off. Moreover, they would catch many of the people who actually are hypocrites in the sense I have defined—especially in cases of failure to adhere to principle. If this is so, why the fuss? The answer is that these errors lead to other misunderstandings that are far more deleterious than a few people being misidentified, whether as hypocrites or not. They cause us to abandon our moral standards and to believe that self-development is impossible. Both errors would likely strike many of us as irrational, but what is important here is how misconceiving hypocrisy leads to such errant views even if we do not recognize it is happening as we make our assessments. I should note that everything I say here presupposes that being hypocritical is morally blameworthy and we should seek to avoid being labelled as such. I suppose some might object to this, but that would be a different argument.

In the case of hypocrisy being understood as failure to live up to one’s own standards, we are encouraged to revise our sense of improvement to radically diminished standards. If one seeks to avoid being a hypocrite in this wrongly understood sense, he will perpetually set standards for himself that he can rather obviously achieve—but this corrodes the very notion of striving. In the most extreme cases, the sense of excellence may in fact be virtually destroyed. Our prior example of fiscal responsibility holds good here. If someone sets a monthly budget for himself but fails to achieve it, revising the budget to conform to his spending needs as opposed to his earnings is obviously problematic. My alternative definition of hypocrisy, however, produces no such problem. If the man simply acknowledges that he made some poor decisions that caused him to exceed his principles-derived budget, this act of contrition and desire to reform counter the charge of hypocrisy. It is not that his principle is wrong but that he failed to understand how to achieve it; there is nothing disingenuous or manipulative about his commitment to the principle.

When it comes to the reformation of our standards being misconstrued as hypocrisy, we are left having to say that our present manner of living is simply perfect and whatever changes that come are problematic. This, of course, is to put it too baldly. No one really believes such a proposition, but this is the effect of so misconstruing hypocrisy. To return to the prior example, the religious celibate who had a prior life of sexual frivolity being called a hypocrite suggests exactly this: that the celibacy is somehow illegitimate because of the prior actions. If this makes one a hypocrite and being hypocritical is to be avoided, the sexual frivolity should be embraced once more. This effectively suggests an ossification of every person into their present standards, regardless of what they are. Obviously, we do not think this; we surely recommend that the drug addict seek treatment and come to believe that drugs are a thing not to be used. This misunderstanding likely emerges from simple pride: we hate to admit we were once wrong. I know, both personally and anecdotally, that this is often the most difficult part of a religious conversion (or reversion), but to resist on this basis is to deny the possibility of improvement.

Now, as I have stated, I do not think that people espouse such misconceptions of hypocrisy consistently or knowing the errors to which they lead. Despite this, we frequently adopt views that run counter to others we also hold; this is a part of managing the complexity of human life: the art of balancing the many perspectives and principles that are not all equally obvious to us in each moment as we traverse this path from birth to death. This is, of course, why thinking is not merely for the philosopher: it is also how we become our more integrated and harmonious selves. As noted above, my view is that these misapplications of hypocrisy likely come from the sense of responsibility they make us feel; this concession is no apologia but only a recognition of why we might entertain such errors. Living a moral life of high standards and pursuing excellence is an arduous venture; the fact that we have excuses at the ready for our failures is hardly a surprise. My hope here is only that identifying the extreme outcomes of such errant forms of thinking is the best antidote to avoiding them—even when they are obviously available and most tempting.