In Pursuit of Democracy

The word ‘democracy’ has become something of a buzzword in today’s political discourse, though it tends to be used in a manner that is not merely an easy term to throw around but as something believed to have true substance – this word is supposedly making a real demand of us. There has been an uptick in politicians among countries with various forms of elected representation claiming that ‘democracy’ is somehow under threat by their political opposition. Alternatively, democracy is frequently invoked as kind of ‘moral’ signifier: ‘That is conduct unfit for a democratic society,’ or something of that likeness. The term is employed with such malleability not only in common parlance but also within (supposedly) elite institutions which are, therefore, (allegedly) more judicious and precise with their terminology. In fact, there is an entire subset of political theory that is seemingly gaining ever greater prominence: democratic theory – but what is meant by democracy in this field seems to shift with any given study or scholar. Given the prevalence of this word’s use, it seems prudent to consider its several meanings; I say this not in the sense of ‘correcting’ this wide array of uses but so as to help us recognize the duplicity and, hopefully, abate confusion when ‘democracy’ is invoked in different contexts.

In my view, this duplicity is not necessarily incoherent, nor do I believe that the various understandings of ‘democracy’ are disconnected from one another. Simultaneously, however, I think the term can inadvertently be interpreted to mean more or less than is intended in a given context because of the interconnected nature of the different meanings. Moreover, to acknowledge that the several uses are interrelated does not mean that they cannot contradict or disconnect from one another in some cases. I say this as a preamble to understanding my breakdown of the term. I will limit myself to three main uses I commonly encounter, though these distinctions can have some overlap or degrees of intensity that may suggest to others that further subdivisions in the definitions could be made – but I will leave that to whoever has such an interest. For my purposes here, I distinguish between three core understandings of ‘democracy’: as a form of rule, as a form of association, and as a synonym of equality. I will try to unpack some of the intricacies of each notion while also contrasting them against one another to see their possible complementarities and tensions.

The most literal understanding of democracy can be found in the term’s Greek roots: δῆμος (demos, people) and κράτος (kratos, power). This linguistic source is direct in its suggestion: democracy means that political power rests in ‘the people’ as such. Of course, there would even need to be some mediated understanding of who constitutes the people, but this can nonetheless be juxtaposed with other forms of government that do not involve any sort of popular basis such as aristocracy or monarchy wherein there are a select few or just one person who rule(s). Importantly, this is a source of political power, not a description of the kind of political order that will be generated. Thus, democracy in this view must be understood as a conception of authority from whence political power is derived; this does not preclude it from becoming somewhat tyrannical (like a despotism of the masses), and there is nothing to say that a democracy will institute collective actions that truly redounded to the people’s common benefit or good.

Among political thinkers in Ancient Greece – namely Plato – democracy was not viewed favourably because he assumed that it would entail constant squabbling between different parties and individuals to attain their own desires. This disdain is frequently misunderstood by modern people who have but a superficial gloss of Plato’s views. Plato considered democracy as nearly akin to what we today might call anarchy (though that too would be misleading if taken too seriously); it involved masses vying for influence among one another without overarching considerations of order or goodness. Moreover, Plato seemed to think that democracy would entail no underlying rules or laws to regulate the passional conflicts of a citizenry. Evidently, many of the states we now call democracies are not democracies in this sense – those we have today tend to fall into the second and perhaps third definitions that I consider next.

In modern politics, there is a turn toward what we might call isonomy that now tends to be conflated with our understanding of democracy; to be clear, I am using a more contemporary understanding of isonomy, as there is some debate about its meaning for the ancient Greeks – but to weigh in carefully in this debate would take me too far afield. For my present analysis, people today will likely have encountered the notion of isonomy as I am using it in the phrase ‘the rule of law.’ Isonomy, also derived from Greek roots, literally refers to ἴσος (isos, equal) and νόμος (nomos, law); briefly, we might call it “equality before the law.” This notion implies that everyone must subscribe to and act in accordance with the law – understood as a set of rules – in equal fashion. Typically, this manifests as a number of prohibitions. Some people might also refer to this type of politics and government as one aiming for ‘negative liberty’ or following ‘classical liberal’ ideology, though I would argue that these both have misleading connotations as people tend to use them nowadays. In any event, the reason that this became an aspect of our thinking about democracy is largely due to the importance it places upon the human being as such; even if imperfectly, this view suggests that every person should be treated with respect and that one’s polity is dignified and legitimated in its proper treatment of all people. In this way, I would suggest that the meaning of democracy shifts from being the power of the people to the good of the people – evidently distancing itself from the literal etymology.

A further detail to recognize here is the near necessity of constitutionalism to act as a grounding, normative framework that upholds this notion of isonomic equality which becomes conflated with democracy. A constitution is essentially the articulation of principles that aim to ensure equality before the law is upheld. This is the underlying logic of any given bill of rights; it enumerates the claims of what it means to be a citizen or member of a given polity, and the many laws that are legislated then must not contradict those guarantees. A simple example is a right to life entailing obvious prohibitions on actions like murder or assault, though there are evidently many other granular examples that we could consider. I highlight this constitutional aspect for two key reasons: firstly, the ‘democratic’ aspect of a constitution upholding a concern for isonomy has no inherent connection with a democratic regime in terms of it being the ‘power of the people’ and can, in fact, be upheld by an entirely other form of authority such as a monarch; secondly, this shift toward articulating equality leads into the third conceptualization of ‘democracy’ as a normative moral standard.

The last notion of democracy extends beyond understanding equality as isonomic – here, equality begins to take on more substantive considerations. Within the conception of democracy as isonomy, people are largely understood to have common limitations, what we discussed earlier as prohibitions, which can also be framed as ‘rights’ from another perspective. Over time, however, these rights that emerged from a negative standpoint begin to take on a positive character. For example, to invoke once more the right to life, a positive conception may move beyond mere prohibitions on violence to guarantees of food or housing. Depending on how this is construed, this transforms the role of government from merely being an arbiter and guard to a provider and lord. A common policy sector that I have noticed getting wrapped up in this sort of language is that of healthcare – this is now taken to be a prerequisite of any ‘free and democratic society.’

I do believe that this final construal of the meaning of democracy is much more tenuous and still being hashed out in many ways. A retort that someone might have is that I am confusing mere democracy with liberal democracy, which may well be a sustainable distinction; my response, however, is that people do not necessarily speak in that language – mere democracy is frequently invoked as a sufficient marker. Democracy sits in the centre of these discourses, and there are perpetual tensions over the meaning of the demos, the people, hence why the term ‘democracy’ has such salience. This moves perpetually in the two directions that I have outlined above: First, who are ‘the people’ that get to act (i.e., in whom is authority located)? Second, what is the nature of a person who is governed (what is the ‘good’ of the people)? Obviously, these questions are themselves interconnected, but they also can be at odds. It is possible for ‘the people’ to will what is not their own good, and it is possible for the ‘good of the people’ to be upheld by a tyrant. This should indicate the duplicitous manner in which democracy can be used. This is the tension to which I hope we might attend and inspect more carefully.

In short, my simplified threefold taxonomy indicates two major distinctions with regard to how we utilize the word ‘democracy.’ Firstly, it can mean either a form of rule or association; the former assumes that the people are the source of power whereas the latter implies a kind of basic protection for anyone considered a person within the polity. There is no inherent connection between these two aspects – one can exist without the other, though both can also exist alongside one another. Secondly, who is considered a ‘person’ in a democratic association can be construed in either a negative or a positive form, meaning that people can be associated in terms of rules that regulate behaviour or through policies that work to generate substantively similar circumstances for each person. Again, a given polity can pursue both ‘negative’ and ‘positive’ policies simultaneously in different sectors, and there can also be contests between these goals. Importantly, due to the tensions that exist between these various distinctions, different people employing the term ‘democracy’ may be intending quite different ideas in their contingent circumstances. This is the confusion which I hope I have helped clarify slightly so that we might be more attuned to the ways in which this term is used and abused in our contemporary political discourse.

My impression is that there is something in our zeitgeist that presumes that democracy is an inherent good – yet, I am also never convinced that I understand what democracy means when someone makes such a claim. Is it about the source of power or the way in which political power structures our social relations? Should those relations be understood as common regulations or substantive obligations? I cannot tell – and, worse, I fear that others are unaware that such instability exists within the language that is most central to our political discourse. If this is the case, I can only assume that we will continue to talk past one another and aim at radically different objectives – realities that are corrosive to productive political life as such. If politics is about encounter and coordination, to misunderstand one another is the first step toward disarray and animosity. My hope is that, as inconvenient and annoying as theorizing may be, such reflection may help inform our avoidance of the many pitfalls present in the human predicament.